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In this paper I would like to resolve a tension in Irish Murdoch’s account in The Sovereignty 
of Good concerning the role of aesthetic and intellectual disciplines in the virtuous life. By 
‘aesthetic disciplines’ I mean crafts such as painting, literature, music, and by ‘intellectual 
disciplines’ fields like history, chemistry, biology, physics, and of course philosophy.  
Throughout the text, especially the final chapter “The Sovereignty of Good Over Other 
Concepts,” Murdoch frequently switches between two ways of describing these disciplines; even 
sometimes in the same sentence: “these studies are not only an exercise in virtue, they might be 
thought of as introductory images of the spiritual life.”
1
 What is the tension exemplified in this 
sentence? At some points Murdoch appears to claim that engaging these disciplines is a training 
ground for acquiring virtue. For example: 




[A]n intellectual discipline can play the same kind of role as that which I have 





According to this view, being a good painter or chemist can prepare one for the moral or 
spiritual life because it demands “justice, accuracy, truthfulness, realism, humility, courage…”
4
; 
but strictly speaking, painting and chemistry can only have the status of stepping-stones on the 
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path to virtue; they are, as it were, “introductory images of the spiritual life.”
 5
 Murdoch seems to 
make this explicit when she claims that “they are not the spiritual life itself and the mind which 
has ascended no farther has not achieved the whole of virtue.”
6
 However, Murdoch also appears 
to claim that engaging aesthetic and intellectual disciplines can be genuine exercises of virtue, 
that is, manifestations of excellent morality. For example: 
[A]esthetic situations are not so much analogies of morals as cases of morals. 





Art then is not a diversion or a side-issue, it is the most educational of all human 




I think there is a way of the intellect, a sense in which intellectual disciplines are 




But apart from special contexts, studying is normally an exercise of virtue as well 





On this reading, chemistry and painting are not stepping-stones to virtue, but instances of virtue 
itself. That is, when a chemist is performing his job well, he is not merely performing a set of 
technical procedures properly, but he is doing something morally good too. As such, virtue is not 
confined to typical moral situations (i.e. whether I should be honest to my parents about crashing 
the car); rather, it extends to every sphere of one’s life.  
  So, what is the status of these disciplines? Are they prior to the exercise of virtue or part of 
it? Or are they perhaps semi-virtuous (“not the whole of virtue”)?
11
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I will argue that the moral status of these disciplines—whether they are trainings for virtue or 
exercises of virtue—is relative to an agent’s epistemic and spiritual standing in regards to the 
Good. Getting clear on Murdoch’s theory of Good will require closer attention, but broadly 
construed, for Murdoch, Good is a transcendent perfection that is “perhaps never exemplified in 
the world we know,” nonetheless it is the sovereign moral concept that structures “true 
morality.”
12
 By a relationship with the Good, I take Murdoch to intend more than knowledge or 
understanding of a concept (the epistemic dimension), but also a spiritual condition of the soul 
that is shaped by a love of the Good and virtue (the spiritual dimension). The key to my 
argument is that a relationship with the Good is a necessary condition for being virtuous, but that 
attaining such a relationship is not contingent on prior engagement of said aesthetic and 
intellectual disciplines. 
The paper is divided up as follows. In Section Two I present Murdoch’s theory of the Good 
and virtue, with special emphasis on Murdoch’s identification of the Good with reality, and the 
ways in which reality is hierarchically organized. In Section Three I try to resolve the tension 
between intellectual and aesthetic disciplines qua trainings for virtue and intellectual and 
aesthetical disciplines qua exercise of virtue. In Section Three I consider an objection to my 
account, namely, that Murdoch thinks that there can be a virtuous peasant, i.e. that an 
unexamined life can be worth living. I respond to this objection by showing that Murdoch thinks 
that there are many paths to virtue; as such, an aesthetic or intellectual life is not a necessary 
condition on possession of virtue. Finally, in Section Four, I offer some concluding remarks. 
2. Murdoch’s Theory of the Good or Virtue 
 
Understanding Murdoch’s views about the Good is especially challenging because like other 
moral philosophers of the 20
th
 century she maintains that ‘Good’ is indefinable, albeit for 
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 In this section, I will not attempt a comprehensive account of 
her views; rather I will highlight a key aspect of her theory that will be central to my argument. 
That is, a true understanding of what the Good consists of necessarily involves knowledge about 
the interconnectedness and unity of reality. We are focusing on this aspect of Murdoch’s theory 
of the Good because as we will see in Section Three, until an agent can place the various 
dimensions of her life (e.g. aesthetic and intellectual disciplines)  into the correct rank of reality’s 
hierarchy, her engagement with said disciplines cannot constitute genuine exercises of virtue.  
Let us begin with the passage where Murdoch defines ‘Good’:  
 
The proper and serious use of the term [Good] refers us to a perfection which is 
perhaps never exemplified in the world we know (‘there is no good in us’) and 
which carries with it the ideas of hierarchy and transcendence. How do we know 
that the very great are not the perfect? We see differences, we sense directions, 
and we know that the Good is still somewhere beyond. The self, the place where 
we live, is a place of illusion. Goodness is connected with the attempt to see the 





Notice that there are two senses in which ‘Good’ is being used in this passage. In the first 
(metaphysical) sense, ‘good’ refers to reality. In the second (normative) sense, ‘good’ or 
‘goodness’ is used to describe the pursuit of Good, that is, virtue. Before we turn to examining 
these two ways that Murdoch uses ‘Good’, let me address a potentially misleading aspect of this 
passage. At first glance, Murdoch seems to be suggesting that the Good is epistemically 
inaccessible; as such, one might wonder what Murdoch is up to in offering us a robust 
conception of the Good. However, in saying that ‘Good’ “refers us to a perfection which is 
perhaps never exemplified in the world we know,” Murdoch is claiming that the selves which we 
inhabit do not contain Goodness; rather, the self consists of various barriers that prevents us from 
accessing reality or the Good. The claim, then, is that the Good is something external to us; it is 
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not found in, say, mere virtuous thinking or good intentions. To access the Good and become 
virtuous, we need to engage the world around us. As Murdoch says, ‘Good is a transcendent 
reality’ means that virtue is the attempt to pierce the veil of the selfish consciousness and join the 
world as it really is.
15
 The good is transcendent, then, because we are not inherently good—
“there is no good in us.” Nevertheless, though we can have knowledge of the Good, we cannot 
have complete or pure knowledge of the Good because we are ultimately constrained by our 
psychological barriers. It is important to remember that for Murdoch, we cannot be fully 
acquainted with the Good because when “we look outside the self what we see are scattered 
intimations of Good.”
16
 As finite beings, we are inevitably bounded by “psychological barriers to 
goodness,”
17
 which makes it impossible for us to have a comprehensive understanding of the 
Good, and consequently be perfectly virtuous.  Thus, at best, we can only have what I will call a 
“robust” relationship with the Good, that is, an epistemic and spiritual orientation towards the 
Good that can sufficiently ground a true virtuous life.  
 Let us now turn to the metaphysics of the Good. For Murdoch, the Good and reality are 
closely related if not identical. 
 If apprehension of good is apprehension of the individual and the real, then good 




Closely connecting or perhaps even identifying the Good with reality is a key move for 
Murdoch, but what does it afford her? Have we really refined our concept or are we just playing 
a different language game? Perhaps one benefit is that it reduces some of the mysteriousness 
about the Good. That is, on Murdoch’s view, the Good is not a distinct transcendent object 
existing in a Platonic heaven that we should seek to intellectually apprehend; rather Goodness 
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exists in the world we inhabit. This is not to say, however, that Murdoch is not a moral realist 
because the value that Murdoch is indicating is that which is latent in every aspect of our lives. 
On this view, “the area of morals, and ergo moral philosophy, can now be seen, not as a hole-
and-corner matter of debts and promises, but as covering the whole of our mode of living and the 
quality of our relations with the world.”
19
 There are a host of questions that arise in regard to the 
metaphysical relationship between the Good and the real, but what is important for us to keep in 
mind for the rest of this section is that to access the Good involves are a fundamental accessing 
what is real, to see things as they are. This is important because it will help us appreciate 
Murdoch’s claim that understanding the Good involves understanding the unity and 
interconnectedness of reality, 
The mind which has ascended to the vision of the Good can subsequently see the 
concepts through which it has ascended (art, work, nature, people, ideas, 
institutions, situations, etc., etc.) in their true nature and in their proper 




As indicated in this passage, Murdoch thinks that Good qua reality is rationally organized. In this 
sense reminiscent of Plato, Murdoch argues that there is a hierarchy and unity within reality, and 
that the Good is the highest reality or the greatest degree of reality. As such, the aesthetic and 
intellectual disciplines under consideration are related to each other in objective or real ways, 
and once one understands reality (a “vision of the good”); one will be able to situate these 
disciplines in the hierarchy of the world.  
 Let us now turn to the ethics of the Good, that is, what goodness or virtue consists in. 
According to Murdoch, virtue consists of trying to understand the Good, that is, reality. Though 
this conception of virtue might seem odd, the thought here is not wholly unfamiliar. Virtue, 
traditionally understood, constitutes excellent morality—that is, treating others and one’s self in 
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the best way possible. In order to do this, however, we ought to understand some facts about the 
world. In other words, virtue presupposes knowledge of relevant moral facts. Effectively, 
Murdoch is claiming that all facts (e.g. about human beings’ moral psychology, physics, 
chemistry, art, painting, etc.) are morally relevant, because the more we understand about reality 
the better we will be able to exercise virtue. Nevertheless, (as we will see in Section Three) 
Murdoch’s account is offering us something stronger in suggesting that understanding reality as 
such can constitute exercising virtue. Thus, it’s not the case that knowledge of physics or 
chemistry is merely instrumental knowledge in the service of helping us treat other beings well; 
rather, acquiring said knowledge per se is virtuous. 
 Part of the reason why Murdoch emphasizes the connection between virtue and 
understanding reality is her conception of the human being and her spiritual and epistemic 
limitations. As indicated earlier, the greatest barrier humans face in trying to understand reality is 
overcoming the barriers of the self: “There are perhaps in the case of every human being 
insuperable psychological barriers to goodness. The self is a divided thing and the whole of it 
cannot be redeemed any more than it can be known. And if we look outside the self what we see 
are scattered intimations of Good.”
21
 In particular, Murdoch thinks that humans are plagued by 
natural selfishness and the tendency to think that their lives have purpose.
22
 Combined, both of 
these factors prevent human beings from overcoming the comfortable yet deceptive home of the 
self, which offers “consolation, either through imagined inflation of self or through fictions of a 
theological nature.”
23
 Thus, by trying to understand reality, we are effectively, as it were, trying 
to get out of ourselves, which helps us escape our non-virtuous, i.e. vicious, tendencies. 
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3. The Status of Aesthetic and Intellectual Disciplines 
Now that we have a better understanding of Murdoch’s theory of the Good and her 
conception of virtue, we are in a position to resolve the tension indicated in the introduction, 
namely, how aesthetic and intellectual disciplines can both be preparations for virtue, and 
exercises of virtue.  
Aesthetic and intellectual disciplines are preparations or training grounds for virtue in that 
they can help reveal reality to the non-virtuous moral agent; thus, orienting them toward virtue, 
i.e. the activity of trying to overcome the barriers of the self and understand reality. For example, 
in the case of aesthetics, Murdoch says that “the austere consolation of beauty…teaches that 
nothing in life is of any value except the attempt to be virtuous”
24
 and that “Art pierces the veil 
and gives sense to the notion of a reality which lies beyond appearance; it exhibits virtue in its 
true guise in the context of death and chance.”
25
 
 The thought here is that aesthetic and intellectual disciplines have the capacity to reveal 
certain truths to the moral agent (e.g. that pursuing virtue is the only thing of value), which if she 
take seriously, can help her become virtuous. Said disciplines have this capacity to orient their 
practitioner morally because excellence in art or science effectively involves the same concepts 
in ethics. In the case of art, Murdoch says 
And as when we use the nature of art as a clue, we may be able to learn more 
about the central area of morality if we examine what are essentially the same 
concepts more simply on display elsewhere. I mean such concepts as justice, 
accuracy, truthfulness, realism, humility, courage as the ability to sustain clear 




Art reveals reality and because there is a way in which things are there is a 
fellowship of artists. Similarly with scholars. Honesty seems much the same 
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These arts, especially literature and painting, show us the peculiar sense in which 
the concept of virtue is tied on to the human condition. They show us the absolute 
pointlessness of virtue while exhibiting its supreme importance; the enjoyment of 




These passages reflect Murdoch’s commitment to morality not being restricted to traditional 
“moral” situations, i.e. situations that somehow demand one to act morally. Rather, every 
situation in our lives is a moral situation regardless of what we are doing, and the skills or 
concepts necessary to perform well in our lives are uniform across situation types.  
Strictly speaking, however, mere enjoyment of art or engagement with philosophy does not 
constitute virtue if one is not properly related to the Good. That is, practicing intellectual and 
aesthetic disciplines can constitute virtue only when one has achieved a “vision of the good,” 
particularly, knowledge of the hierarchy and unity that obtains in reality. Murdoch tells us that 
“A serious scholar who is also a good man knows not only his subject but the proper place of his 
subject in the whole of his life.” 
29
 The thought here is that mere excellence at some particular 
aesthetic craft or field of inquiry cannot constitute virtue unless understands its moral function 
and role in one’s life—“Excellence has a kind of unity and there are facts about our condition 
from which lines converge in a definite direction.”
30
 As shown in Section Two, understanding 
the Good involves understanding the unity and hierarchical structure of reality, which one can 
only understand after one has achieved a full vision of the Good,
31
 from which one can look back 
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and “subsequently see the concepts through which it has ascended (art, work, nature, people, 




In sum, if an agent does not have a robust relationship with the Good, then intellectual and 
aesthetic disciplines can help orient her towards it. On the other hand, if an agent does have a 
robust relationship with the good, then engaging these disciplines can constitute exercises of 
virtue.  
4. The Virtuous Peasant 
 
One might object to the interpretation on offer by arguing that I have overly-intellectualized 
Murdoch’s conception of virtue. That is, virtue has become something attainable only by those 
who have the privilege to seriously engage art, philosophy, languages, physics, etc. At the outset 
of The Sovereignty of Good, however, Murdoch argues against Socrates’ claim in The Apology 
that only the examined life is worth living. Contra Socrates, Murdoch claims that an unexamined 
life can be worth living, for example, the life of the peasant. According to Murdoch, the notion 
“that an unexamined life can be virtuous”
33
—a fundamental moral notion—has been erroneously 
“theorized away”
34
 by analytic philosophy. The notion of a virtuous peasant is problematic for 
my interpretation, the thought goes, because being a peasant in Murdoch’s sense precludes one 
from engaging any of the aforementioned practices—by definition a peasant is neither an artist 
nor an intellectual.  
 In response, I first want to stress that beyond the first pages of the text under consideration, 
Murdoch does not really address the virtuous peasant. In fact, Murdoch tends to address the life 
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of the painter or the philosopher, as opposed to the life of the farmer or shepherd. As such, there 
might a legitimate case to be made against Murdoch in that claims to save the virtue of the 
layman, but only focuses on the virtue of the intellectual. Nevertheless, I think that Murdoch has 
the resources to respond to the objection at hand. To begin, it’s important to remember that for 
Murdoch, nobody can have an unadulterated vision of the Good—as finite moral agents with 
various psychological barriers, we can never fully overcome the self and see the Good in and of 
itself (as she puts it, we only have access to scattered intimations of the Good). Furthermore, 
getting in cognitive contact with the Good is a matter of overcoming the self. As we saw in 
Section Three, intellectual and aesthetic disciplines, according to Murdoch, can help a moral 
agent overcome her selfish tendencies and fictitious self-consolations. These are not, however, 
the only spiritual exercises that can help a moral agent become virtuous. In the case of the 
peasant, for example, such disciplines might be completely unnecessary because she is not 
plagued by the psychological barriers of painters and philosophers. As Murdoch tells us: 
“perhaps the virtuous peasant has got out of the cave without even noticing the fire [the selfish 
empirical consciousness].”
35
 In other words, a peasant might be predisposed to the acquisition 
and exercise of virtue in ways that others are not, and her virtue is in no way compromised by 
not engaging said disciplines as a training or exercise of virtue.  
 If engaging in aesthetic and intellectual disciplines is not necessary to acquire virtue, then 
this implies that aesthetic and intellectual disciplines are not necessary activities in the virtuous 
life. In the same way, being a farmer or a shepherd is a not necessary feature of the virtuous life. 
Rather, these are contingent facts about human beings, which are not really up to us. Instead, 
what do we have control over is how we engage the world from our perspective and status within 
it. Thus, while there is a unity in the world, there is not necessarily a unity in virtue or value: 
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The notion that value should be in some sense unitary, or even that there should 
be a single supreme value concept, may seem, if one surrenders the ideas of God, 
far from obvious. Why should there not be many different kinds of independent 
moral values? Why should all be one here? The madhouses of the world are filled 
with people who are convinced that all is one. It might be said that ‘all is one’ is a 





Thus, while the virtuous peasant must organize and prioritize her activities according to the unity 
of reality; there does not necessarily have to be a unity amongst the activities of moral agents. 
This is a through and through virtue ethics: different moral situations will demand different types 
of virtuous actions, and all of this depends on various acts about the moral agent in question. 
This is not to say that the virtues are arbitrary. There is a unity of the virtues, that is, there are 
specific virtues which we can identify and objectively classify. However, such character traits do 
not necessarily dictate uniform actions. For example, the virtue of wisdom will not necessarily 




In this paper I have argued that Murdoch offers us a consistent theory of virtue, and that she has 
the resources to account for both the virtue of the intellectual and the peasant. First I reconciled 
the alleged tension in Murdoch’s account of aesthetic and intellectual disciplines. Recall, at some 
points Murdoch describes these activities as preparations for virtue, and at other times genuine 
exercises or instantiations of virtue. My solution hinged on one’s epistemic standing towards the 
Good. That is, if one has achieved the requisite vision of the Good, then such activities can 
constitute actual virtue. However, if one has not achieved a vision of the Good, then such 
activities will merely put one on the path to cognitive contact with the Good. As such, according 
to Murdoch, the only necessary condition on virtue is that one has an appropriate epistemic and 
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spiritual relationship with the Good. This requires that one be able to organize the various 
activities in her life according to the hierarchical structure of reality; however, the Good does not 
necessarily dictate the specific types of actions that the virtuous agent does. In this way, 
Murdoch is able to reconcile the virtue of the peasant and the philosopher. Both can be virtuous 
(if they have knowledge of the Good, and act accordingly); but this does not require that the 
philosopher engage in farming activities, or that the peasant engage philosophy of mind or 
skepticism. Something seems to be right about Murdoch’s account; that is, a good moral theory 
ought not be elitist—that is, it should not only allow for privileged people to be virtuous. 
However, the metaphysics of Murdoch’s account might still seem suspect to some. That is, in 
exchanging Good for Reality, it seems that Murdoch is still suspect to some traditional 
objections to such robust conceptions of the Good. At the same time, it’s not clear that the virtue 
of her ethics stands or falls with her metaphysical picture of the world. 
 
 
 
